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Another Look at Imoral Art 
 
 
 
Let us begin by proposing a typology of the kinds of immoralism usually 
associated with works of art. First, there is the case of artworks that contain and support 
morally dubious content that was clearly intended by their author. Secondly, we may 
have ethically ambiguous artworks whose author does not clearly distinguish herself 
from malicious characters, situations or actions. And thirdly, there are artworks that 
present stylistic turns that are considered morally wrong.  
The first type of immoral art is often exemplified by Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph 
des Willens, and its infamous glorification of fascism, Ezra Pound’s Cantos with its 
blatant anti-Semitism. The passionate description of sexual violence and misogyny in 
Sade’s Justine or the celebration of the Ku Klux Klan in David W. Griffith’s Birth of a 
Nation, are also among the most recurrent examples of works of art tainted by an 
assumed moral stance that is generally considered to be wrong. 
A second group is constituted by works in which it is difficult, if not altogether 
impossible, to find a clear position of their authors vis-à-vis the kind of message that is 
being conveyed. Let us consider, for instance, the final sequence of Neil Jordan’s The 
Strange in Me (2007), when Jodie Foster’s character executes in cold blood the 
members of the gang that killed her husband, thus replacing the role of an official 
justice that had been discredited by the policeman portrayed by Terrence Howard.  
A third group holds artworks that present formal options that are considered to 
be moral blemishes. In 1959, Gillo Pontecorvo directed Kappo, a film about the survival 
strategies of the Jewish teenager Edith, a prisoner in a German concentration camp. One 
scene of this movie would become particularly famous: one of the camp’s prisoners 
commits suicide by throwing herself against the electrified barbed wire. Pontecorvo 
decided then to do a travelling towards the prisoner’s dead body. This option would 
receive this comment by Jacques Rivette: "The man who decides, on a moment like this, 
to frame the corpse in a contre-plongée, making sure that the risen hand is in a specific 
angle of the final framing (…) [this] man deserves nothing but the deepest contempt”1. 
Rivette was using Jean-Luc Godard’s famous idea according to which “all travellings 
are a moral issue”, thus condemning the obscenity of the “aestheticization of horror”. 
All these cases share an important question: does an ethical flaw necessarily 
constitute an aesthetic flaw? Many philosophers tend to think that by removing the 
moral defects of an artwork one would also be able to improve it in artistic terms. 
Because it is hard to imagine how this ethical cleansing would produce aesthetic 
improvements, other philosophers prefer to keep moral and artistic issues separated. But 
because it is also hard to imagine how these issues can be kept apart in the case of way 
too many artworks, some other philosophers prefer to consider the author’s moral 
intention, however dubious or immoral it may be, as an important condition for the 
aesthetic understanding of the work. These are the three most common ways of 
considering the relation between the moral and the artistic qualities of a work of art: 
autonomism, ethicism and immoralism. This paper proposes a survey of the three 
philosophical theories and assumes a position in favour of the latter. 
    
1. Autonomism 
 
It is fair to think that autonomism is based upon five main arguments: 
disinterestedness, the common denominator argument, art versus “responsive life”, the 
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fact that we are very ignorant of the connections between art and morality, and the 
moral triviality of many artworks. Let us take a closer look at them. 
The historic origin of autonomism or formalism in art is linked to the concept of 
“disinterestedness”.2 This is a recurrent term and probably the most pervasive category 
in modern and contemporary Aesthetics, from Kant to Schopenhauer, from Bergson to 
Croce, from Bullough to Stolnitz. The concept played an important role in making it 
possible for the artistic activity to be considered as a specific phenomenon, a proper 
object waiting for a method of analysis. Basically speaking, the category of 
disinterestedness makes it possible to believe that there is a unique kind of attention that 
we devote to the perception of a kind of objects that are so autonomous and self-
sufficient that can only be fully understood if they are disengaged from real life. It is 
interesting to consider the fact that Anglo-American and French historians dispute the 
philosophical origin of the term. Even more interesting is the fact that both explanations 
establish a deep connection between disinterestedness (and therefore autonomism) and 
some important theological / ethical choices. I.e., if we consider its historical inception, 
we tend to think that autonomism is a kind of moralism. Writing against an article by 
Jerome Stolnitz on the origins of aesthetic disinterestedness3, Rémy Saisselin4 argued 
that the concept emerged out of the dispute between Jesuits and Jansenists concerning 
the issue of whether “Can men love God disinterestedly?” meaning “can men love God 
for its own sake, and not because of their selfish purposes?” The question would be 
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picked up by Leibniz. In a letter to his Scottish friend Burnet, he would propose a 
particular kind of love under the formula of  “amare est felicitate alterius delectari”, 
“trouver son plaisir dans la felicité d’autrui”: “all the things that we desire for their own 
sake (…) give us pleasure because of their excelente qualities in such a way that the 
happiness of the loved object enters our own happiness”. 
Anglo-American historians insist that the category of disinterestedness was 
developed in England and originated in the work of Eighteenth Century philosophers 
reacting against Thomas Hobbes’ moral egotism and religious instrumentalism. 
Disinterestedness became an important argument against the idea that moral agents are 
solely motivated by a desire for personal gain. Lord Shaftesbury’s arguments in this 
respect are particularly interesting because he is arguably the first author to establish a 
connection between the disinterested virtuous man and the art spectator. Interestingly, in 
Shaftesbury’s view disinterestedness is not the same thing as benevolence. It is a 
suspension of the surrounding circumstances and an exercise of personal abstraction.  
Disinterestedness theories lead to aesthetic formalism which is based upon the 
argument of the common denominator: any classificatory criterion that we wish to apply 
to distinguish between art and non-art should be universally applicable to all artworks. 
Formalists would then argue that only the exhibition of form could be taken as the 
common element to all artworks. This implies that, since not every work of art holds a 
moral dimension, it would be misleading to use it as a distinct artistic characteristic. 
Another important argument would be held by the Shaftesbury critics, Roger Fry 
and Clive Bell. In order to distinguish art from non-art, Fry used his famous distinction 
between “responsive” and “imaginative” life. Art liberates us from the network of 
causes and consequences that characterizes everyday life, including the moral 
consequences of our deeds. Thus, any attempt to assess art in terms of its moral 
consequences would jeopardize the criterion by which the very classification of what is 
artistic and what is not is possible. 
Contemporary formalists have also insisted upon the fact that we know very 
little about the behavioural consequences of consuming art and that we know close to 
nothing about how to measure the moral consequences of art. It is often noticed that 
there is no linear causal connection between artistic culture and moral integrity.  
Also, formalists don’t expect art to provide us with any kind of moral or civil 
education. And even if art could transmit a moral ethos in a propositional mode, its 
teachings would be ridiculously trivial. If we compare Beethoven’s Ode to Joy to 
Schiller’s poem it seems clear that the quality of Beethoven’s music transcends 
Schiller’s simple appeal to universal fraternity. On the other hand, many lesser art 
objects are considered to be important from a moral point of view. But their moral value 
does not preclude them from being mediocre art, at best. Uncle Tom’s Cabin was and 
still is an invaluable educational tool but its moral virtues are not enough to turn Harriet 
Beecher Stowe into a great writer.  
Many objections have been traditionally raised against autonomism. How does 
all this apply to art which is morally or politically engaged, such as religious art, 
political art or intervention art? In these cases, political or moral sterilization implies 
aesthetic amputation. Also, and particularly in the case of fiction, many artworks 
depend on the audience’s ability to employ a number of common reasoning (including 
moral assessments) when they read a novel or watch a movie. The fact that the spectator 
is prone to feel some kind of empathy towards a character who has been wrongly 
mistreated or some kind of aversion towards the villain who corrupts a given set of 
established values is important in order to create diegetic traction. 
 
2. Ethicism 
 
In a direct opposition to aesthetic “disinterestedness”, there is the perspective of 
those who argue in favour of a deep connection between art and moral ethos. Aesthetic 
ethicism has many faces but it can be divided into three main groups: the different kinds 
of Platonism, Humean ethicism and contemporary moderate moralism. 
 
2.1. Platonism  
 
Plato’s mistrust of art, albeit a certain kind of art, is present in many other 
authors, such as Rousseau, Tolstoy or George Bernard Shaw. In Plato, and specifically 
in The Republic, the case against mimetic art is supported by two main arguments: the 
Moral Argument and the Ontological Argument. 
The Moral Argument is developed in Books II and III: mimetic art is wrong 
because it seldom imitates what is good and virtuous. This suspicion starts off not with 
an examination of the nature of the art object in itself or with a proper survey of the 
effects such kind of objects has upon its audience, but rather with a disapproval of the 
kind of person that produces art. Human evolution implies social division of labour 
(370b) and it is highly convenient that each man should stick to the practice of only one 
craft. But artists are quite the opposite of this tendency towards specialization. Being an 
imitator, the artist pretends to know every trade and industry of those he imitates or 
whose works he imitates, from the warrior to the merchant and from the warrior to the 
politician. But since it is “impossible for a single person to practice many crafts or 
professions well” (374)5, then there is something pretentious and fake involved in the 
personality of every artist.   
This “professional liar” practices the “lie without nobility” which is to be found 
in the works of Hesiod or Homer. This consists in describing “what the gods and heroes 
are like” (377e) out of a complete ignorance of what is being portrayed. The gods are 
selfish, petty and violent beings, and metamorphosis seems to be a trait of their very 
essence. It is quite normal that so happens because it is through peripety and change that 
the writer grabs his audience. However, what is really divine and good does not change 
and therefore the real god has only one shape and does not lie, beg, or is sorry about his 
deeds, nor does he ever laugh, because (388e). It is obvious then that, since the life of 
the true god or of the virtuous man is so plainly dull, it does not constitute na easy or 
attractive artistic subject: ““[T]his excitable character admits of many multicolored 
imitations. But a rational and quiet character, which always remain pretty well the same, 
is neither easy to imitate nor easy to understand when imitated” (604e). That explains 
why the artistic imitative talent is dedicated to the wrong models because these shall 
always have an eager audience. Plato goes as far as analyzing the style of imitation and 
discovers a particular danger in the way poets tend to use direct speech when “the poet 
himself is speaking and doesn’t attempt to get us to think that the speaker is someone 
other than himself” (393). The imitator should be ashamed of imitating a “character 
unworthy of himself” (396d). Therefore the poet should not use direct speech when he 
represents vicious and despicable characters (395b), slaves and wicked and perverse 
men, madmen or wrongdoers (396a), or even the whining and lamentations of women 
(396d). Because it is difficult to follow this rule in the case of tragedy or comedy, Plato 
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excludes them from his Republic: “for our own good, we ourselves should employ a 
more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller” (398b).  
The Ontological Argument is presented in Book X. In the earlier Books, and in 
spite of all the reservations, art is still admissible. Not so in Book X. If all apparent 
“reality” is already an imitation of ideal archetypes and if virtuous life should lead us 
towards that ideal reality, following an intellectual and not a sensual pathway, why 
should we submit ourselves to art objects that are nothing but imitation of imitations, 
“third from the natural one” (597e)? A master of deceit, the “imitator has neither 
knowledge nor right opinion about whether the things he makes are good or bad” (602a) 
and should therefore be banned of any well ordained city.  
 
 
2.2. Humean Ethicism 
 
Humean ethicism believes that all moral flaws of an artwork are also aesthetic 
defects. This fundamental thesis is present in this passage by David Hume: 
“But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, 
and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper 
characters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and 
to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and 
however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners in his age, I never can relish 
the composition.”6 
 
Whereas platonic moralists argue that a morally flawed artwork is nevertheless 
accessible and enjoyable by its audience, Humean ethicists defend that any immoral 
default shall prevent a proper appreciation of the work.  
Shakespeare, Racine and Corneille were all accused of not respecting the 
Aristotelian principle of poetic justice, i.e., the principle according to which virtue 
should always vanquish and vice should always be defeated. Corneille would even go as 
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far as to argue that the mark of a really grand dramatic work was to make us continue to 
love virtue even when not properly rewarded and abhor vice even if it would remain 
unpunished. Thus, and contrary to Hume, a vicious manner could be in fact be presented 
“without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation”. And 
the work’s content, however offensive it may be, would not make the whole work 
offensive.7 The fact that I “should not” share the sentiments of parts of an artwork does 
not mean I “cannot” do it. Thus, and pace Hume, it seems it is always possible to 
separate description and prescription in any given artwork.  
 
2.3. Moderate moralism 
 
Contrary to more conservative or more radically moralist authors such as Frank 
Palmer or Roger Scruton, moderate moralism is more interested in investigating the role 
that morality plays in our aesthetic transaction with a significant number of important 
artworks. This is a more reasonable position because radical moralism assumes that the 
reader or the viewer is always involved in imagining herself in the role of the character 
and therefore that this empathy always leads to behavioural consequences. However this 
kind of empathy has been frequently defied and it is not clear that this is the norm in the 
fruition of narrative fictions. This kind of moralism is usually based upon three main 
arguments: the best-fit argument, the cognitivist argument and the argument of merited-
response. 
The best-fit argument sustains that to believe that immoral artworks are wrong 
(also, aesthetically speaking) runs in favour of what the majority of art consumers 
believe. This fact is also acknowledged by many artists who, against the autonomist’s 
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beliefs, tend to produce art that is deeply committed to moral, political and religious 
purposes. To ignore their intended moral connections – as suggested by the autonomist -
would make these objects aesthetically incomprehensible. Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect that art is significantly linked to a moral ethos and artworks that disrespect this 
ethos tend to be misperceived by the audience. 
The cognitivist argument defends the idea that morality is often engaged by 
artists and serves an aesthetic function. In the case of fiction, it is important in order to 
create diegetic traction. It is also used to fill in narrative ellipses and the author believes 
that a shared morality will be sufficient to explain several intentional “Leerstelle”, as 
Roman Ingarden would call them: the psychology of certain characters, certain 
sociological features of the fictional world but also the emotions that are required in 
order to understand the piece: e.g., to understand Medea, one has to activate a certain 
horror towards what is going on. It is not art that is serving life but art employing life 
and arguably all narratives involving human issues tend to use the usual moral standards 
of its audience in order to achieve some important efficiency gains. By doing so, argues 
the moderate moralist, it is thereby exposed to moral assessment: if moral standards are 
wrongly used or used in a twisted way that can be seen as constituting an aesthetic flaw. 
Since this kind of narrative provide us with unique opportunities to exercise our powers 
of moral recognition and judgment, it is only natural that we refer to them in ethical 
terms. Thus, and pace the autonomist, much art contributes to our moral learning.  
This also means that fictional narratives constitute unique opportunities for 
exercising our powers of moral recognition and judgment because the process of 
understanding the narrative becomes itself a moral exercise. Since these narratives 
awake and stir our moral powers it is only natural that we should discuss them in ethical 
terms. An important group of artworks are morally educative because they become an 
opportunity for self-understanding. This is the case when the fictional situation 
encourages the audience to produce a new linkage between moral beliefs that were 
previously dispersed (e.g., Haruki Murakami’s short story “The year of the Spaghetti”). 
This is what Noël Carroll calls a transactional or clarificationist perspective of the 
relation between art and morality8: some art contributes to our moral understanding, i.e., 
it strengthens our ability to recognize and assess unexpected connections between our 
moral beliefs. 
 The moral particularism of philosophers such as Iris Murdoch or Martha 
Nussbaum9 believes that a lot of the principles of our moral heritage are so abstract that 
we need to tie them down to real situations in order to achieve a proper perspective of 
them. Art, and particularly fictional narrative, works as the exemplum of medieval 
moral education: 
 -Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein exemplifies the Rousseaunian-like romantic 
principle that evil comes not from nature but from social conditioning. 
 - Henry James’ The Golden Bowl shows an intriguing variation of the 
connection between love and sacrifice. 
 - Tchekhov’s The Cherry Orchard builds the remarkable contrast between 
Lopukhin’s prudent life and the inconsequent and finally desperate bright of Madame 
Ranevskaya’s mundane existence. 
The important point here is that since art plays a significant role in moral 
upbringing, narrative fictions that employ and develop our moral understanding 
become, ipso facto, more absorbing and aesthetically appealing. On the other hand, 
artworks that pervert or confound our moral understanding, by tying, for instance, some 
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moral principles to dubious characters, oppose this clarificationist model and should 
also be disqualified. Noël Carroll exemplifies this moral muddling with the connection 
suggested between homosexuality and monstrosity in Jonathan Demme’s The Silence of 
the Lambs (1991). 
Berys Gaut’s moderate moralism10 is based upon his “Merited Response” 
argument, which derives from the Humean thesis according to which it is impossible for 
us to adopt sentiments that we consider to be immoral. The argument is as follows: 
1. Immoral art expresses a wrong ethical perspective because it calls for the 
imagining of pernicious attitudes and feelings. 
2. Non-ethical responses are never merited. 
3. Non-merited responses constitute artistic flaws. 
4. Thus, immoral art is aesthetically flawed because we have a serious 
motive for not responding in the form prescribed by the author, and such as a horror 
movie that makes us laugh or a comedy that bore us to sleep, artworks that convey a 
moral direction that is not followed by their audience are artistic failures. 
A similar argument could be found in Elizabeth Anderson’s defense of comic 
moralism. Imagine someone tells you a racist joke: “A gypsy and a coloured guy are in 
a car. Who is driving? Answer: The policeman.”  
“Someone may laugh at a racist joke but become embarrassed by her laughter. Her 
embarrassment reflects the judgment that the fact of finding the joke amusing does not 
constitute a proper response to the joke. The joke was not genuinely good or amusing, it 
does not deserve laughter.”11 
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According to Anderson or Gaut, it is the set of moral considerations that shows us if 
a given emotion constitutes or not a proper response to a joke or a work of art. The 
emotions we consider to be not proper do not lead us to emotions such as laughter or 
nostalgia, i.e., the kind of emotions we look for in art. But this seems bizarre. It is true 
that our responses do not always reflect our critical judgments. But it seems odd to think 
that because the joke is incorrect it is therefore not funny. If the joke is genuinely funny 
it seems counterintuitive to think that embarrassment, shame or guilt will be the 
immediate proper response to it. Laughter will. The embarrassment is chronologically 
secondary and what is offensive in a joke can be precisely what is hilarious in it. Thus, 
to moralize the joke is to kill it. 
 
3. Immoralism 
 
What if the moral turbulence manifested by an artwork is instrumental to its 
aesthetic experience?  This is the kind of question that intrigues both autonomists and 
ethicists. But they make entire sense for the supporters of aesthetic immoralism which 
could be divided into two major trends: functional immoralism and anti-moralism. 
 
3.1. Functional immoralism 
 
Lawrence Hyman argued that the subversive or transgressive character of much 
art is intrinsically valuable.12 The tension between our aesthetic reaction and our ethical 
response can clarify our moral standards and act as a catalyst of aesthetic experience. 
Now, both responses (moral repulse and aesthetic fascination) must be simultaneous 
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because the specific type of moral disgust one feels when we are having an aesthetic 
experience is only comprehensible because there is already an aesthetic experience to 
start with. Even Plato admitted the special kind of charm that the “artistic lies” had upon 
him. 
Functional immoralism lies in symmetric contrast to the cognitivist section of 
moderate moralism. The latter underlines the important functional role of moral 
engagement when it comes to create diegetic traction. The former stresses the dramatic 
effect of moral disgust. Take the case of King Lear and his cruel mockery of 
Gloucester’s blindness when the Earl asks the King if he knows him: 
“I remember thine eyes well enough. Dost thou squiny at me? No, do thy worst, blind 
cupid, I’ll not love.” 
 
3.2. Anti-moralism 
   
Anti-moralists believe that to judge that it is wrong to feel a certain emotion, or 
that it is wrong to have fun or become amused with something that transmits such an 
emotion, is logically distinct from the judgment that the response intended by the author 
is not merited (i.e., that the joke isn’t funny or that the artwork is aesthetically flawed). 
This thesis is supported by five main claims.  
The first claim holds that some art is purportedly “incorrigible”13 and requires 
the tension between our aesthetic reaction and our moral response. If there really exists 
such a thing as “morally incorrigible” art (by this meaning artworks whose aesthetic 
value cannot be detached from its aesthetic value) then both the autonomist and the 
ethicist are wrong. Some significant examples could be presented: Sade’s Justine, Leni 
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Riefenstahl’s documentaries14; or Céline’s novels15. It is as wrong to argue that the 
immorality in these works of art is an adventitious characteristic as it is wrong to think 
that they would be made better if their moral flaws could be filtered out. 
A second claim sustains that the kind of moral repulsion we feel when 
experiencing instances of “immoral art” is of a specific nature and one that is 
conceptually comprehensible only because it takes place within the framework of an 
experience that is already aesthetic to begin with. The anti-moralist argues that many of 
the emotions traditionally perceived as proper responses to artworks, such as being 
amused or intrigued, or challenged in a general way, are not permeable to moral 
considerations. Thus, in many cases, moral discussion about whether it is wrong to be 
delighted or amused with some given artwork has nothing to do with the nature of this 
delight. In fact, we will only reach the position to assess the aesthetic merits or 
demerits, properly speaking, of an artwork, if one gets access to it to start with and if we 
are already engaged in an aesthetic experience. Only then will further considerations 
such as whether it is proper or not to entertain such thoughts, may occur. 
A third argument starts off by noticing that contemporary moralists tend to 
follow Hume’s assumption according to which “I cannot, nor is it proper I should” 
enjoy a morally flawed artwork. But there is no reason to conflate the “I can” and the “I 
should not”, i.e., the descriptive and the normative dimensions of aesthetic experience. 
The fact is that I can imaginatively follow and even be amused by morally flawed 
artworks even when I know or perhaps precisely because I know “I should not”. If we 
are not willing or able to try to imagine what the works prescribes us then we are in no 
position to assess its aesthetic value just like if I don’t get the joke, I am in no position 
to assess its humour. Moderate moralists seem to postulate the idea that the audience 
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constitutes an epistemic subject. This epistemic ideal is not only highly discriminative 
when it comes to passing judgments of taste but also infallibly correct in regards to 
moral judgment. On the one hand, it is highly improbable that this epistemic subject 
constitutes a fair sociological grasp of the “normal behavior” of common spectators. On 
the other hand, moral hypersensitivity also exists and can be a real problem in accessing 
artworks. Kendall Walton, for instance, believes that Triumph des Willens can only 
inspire aversion and despise.16 This artwork is morally inaccessible. Now, the price of 
opera tickets can be a real problem and make it inaccessible to a large fraction of the 
population. But we wouldn’t go as far as to argue that the price of the tickets constitute 
an aesthetic flaw.17 Similarly, the anti-moralist may concede that moral repugnance 
towards any given artwork can make it inaccessible to some, but cannot admit that such 
inaccessibility constitute an aesthetic flaw. 
A fourth claim holds that our moral personality is built upon our capacity to 
imagine from a variety of viewpoints and art is particularly valuable because it increases 
the data from which we construct our imaginings, and this is particularly true of 
“immoral art. Moral particularists have demonstrated the power of imagination when it 
comes to building up a minimally consistent moral personality. True ethical 
understanding comes from the juxtaposition of several ethical perspectives and from the 
capacity to imagine based upon that variety of points of view, including those that seem 
to us morally distorted. Ethics determines what I ought and what I ought not to do and is 
based upon my ability to imagine the possible causes, scenarios and consequences of 
my actions. One of art’s potentials is to increase the data of my imaginings. In fact, 
eugenics in art is dangerous because it deprives us of one of the most powerful ways to 
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get in touch with our own dark side and to bring it out into the imaginings that are the 
intuitive basis of our moral personality. 
Contrary to Hume, “I can” imagine the dark or condemnable side of an artwork. 
It is only after that that I decide whether I should or not.  
Against this claim, Matthew Kieran would argue that  
“Imaginative understandings of life are always normative, even if this merely 
inheres in their negativity, and are always open to normative judgment. Thus a work 
that promotes a false imaginative understanding of others and the world is disvaluable 
as art. (…) Where a work promotes an immoral imaginative understanding, the artwork 
is disvaluable as art.”18 
But the problem here is how we go from “a work that promotes a false 
imaginative understanding of others and the world is disvaluable as art” to “a work 
[that] promotes an immoral imaginative understanding, the artwork is disvaluable as 
art”. Surely the same could be said of completely optimistic and “pollyannic” artworks, 
i.e., artworks that are excessively optimistic, such as fairy tales or romantic comedies. 
Shouldn’t we then dismiss narratives with happy endings because they are also 
promoting a false imaginative understanding of the world? Shouldn’t we also consider 
whether morally undisturbed and righteous works are not intrinsically “disvaluable as 
art”? 
A fifth and final claim believes that it is more often the case than not that we 
remain uncorrupted by a malicious character or a work’s repulsive ethics. The fact that 
we are capable of ethically “surviving” such works should give us a deeper sense of our 
moral commitments and of the soundness of their structure. 
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